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TOWARD A THEORY OF
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
PAUL J. WEBER, S.J. *
RAGHAVAN N. IYER, a contemporary student 
of Gandhi, recently
wrote:
Broadly, we might say that there are two familiar types of in-
furiating people. One is the moralist; the other is the legalist.
The moralist is infuriating when he wants to raise every single
issue, however local and specific, to the status of an eternal prin-
ciple; the legalist is infuriating when he wants to reduce an
important matter of moral principle involving basic human rights
and human dignity to mere formalism or sheer expediency.'
In recent years the most infuriating people have been found milling
around the civil rights movement. On the one hand we see moral
leaders standing up to be counted among the righteous on some
highly questionable platforms, and on the other we see the whole
movement condemned to die because it is "a disruptive element."
Both of these attitudes speak of a profound and widespread ignor-
ance of the nature and the role of civil disobedience. Numerous
articles, editorials and books have done little to change this. Perhaps
the reason for the continued confusion is that civil disobedience is
a concept exceedingly hard to reconcile with one's day to day political
and moral views.
Now that the spectacular has become routine, and we have had a
chance to see many of the faces of contemporary civil disobedience,
it is time to give the theoretical aspects a valid place within tradi-
tional political thought. For if we are to have any way to judge
acceptable and non-acceptable forms of civil disobedience, it is
absolutely imperative that we formulate a theory by which men can
integrate the existence of civil disobedience into a traditional under-
* B.A. (1962), Ph.L. (1964), M.A. (1965), St. Louis University.
I Iyer, Civil Disobedience: An Occasional Paper (Center for the Study of
Democratic Institutions 1966).
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standing of law and order, justice and
authority, the rights of individuals and
of governments. This paper is an initial
attempt in that direction.
The task is difficult because-at the
risk of being doubly infuriating-we
must insist that civil disobedience is a
legal and a moral problem, and must be
treated as such. It is a legal problem
because, while civil disobedience honors
Law in general by openly breaking a
law, civil law cannot so much as admit
its right to existence without denying its
own prerogative as the monopoly of co-
ercive power. Civil disobedience is a
moral problem because, while it appeals
to justice and the dignity of man, if
handled without law, civil disobedience
becomes a matter of personal or collec-
tive passion and is socially disastrous.
To handle civil disobedience without
treating both aspects would make any
theory myopic. Therefore, a valid theory
must be based on some not strictly legal,
not strictly moral foundation which in-
cludes them both.
Philosophy furnishes one such founda-
tion, and perhaps the best. But even
here, two precautions are necessary.
First, we cannot treat civil disobedience
in philosophical isolation. It must be
handled within the context of law, jus-
tice, prudence, authority, the rights of in-
dividuals and the rights of government,
because each of these is involved in any
act of civil disobedience. Second, since
this is the case, we cannot be completely
eclectic in our understanding of concepts.
We simply have to stay within a single,
integrated system, because in discussing
an activity that involves law, authority,
justice and all the rest, we must realize
their interlocking nature. What is said
of one clearly has implications for the
others. To discuss the law of Oliver
Wendell Holmes within the context of a
Hegelian State, for example, is as absurd
as integrating Marxian justice with
Hobbesean authority. One has to work
within a single system. For working out
a comprehensive theory of civil disobedi-
ence I have chosen the Thomistic philos-
ophy of law. 2
On the other hand, when using such a
model, we cannot cut the cloth to fit the
frame. We must begin with civil dis-
obedience as it actually is. Therefore,
before putting the Thomistic model to
work, we must attempt to formulate a
clear notion of civil disobedience. This
we shall do in two ways: first, by pre-
senting an historical sketch of civil dis-
obedience; and second, by analyzing it
in its present form.
I.
Resistance to government is as old as
government itself. An expressed theory
of passive resistance in the name of
something nobler is much more recent.
Sophocles' Antigone is our first surviving
reference to such a theory. Formulated
2 Although ordinarily one does not feel obliged
to defend his philosophical moorings, consid-
ering prevalent attitudes towards Thomism,
perhaps a comment on the subject is oppor-
tune. First, I have chosen to use the Thomistic
model not because of any basic commitment
to the whole system, but because it seems the
best available model to gain an integral under-
standing of civil disobedience. It is a philoso-
phy of law which intrinsically involves justice,
authority, the rights of citizens and the rights
of government. At the same time, while be-
ginning with eternal law, it does not deny the
validity, even necessity of case-based, inductive
human law. Far from it!
with primitive simplicity, it remains a
classic statement of political philosophy.
Some authors have attempted to prove
that Christ, or at least St. Paul, was an
incipient theoretician of civil disobedi-
ence. 3 While this is hardly tenable, it
does appear that the early Christians
often practiced passive disobedience to
civil authorities. But only occasionally
did they weave it into Christian theory.
The clearest example is that of Lactan-
tius, writing in 304 A.D. about con-
stancy:
Constancy is a virtue, not in order
that we may resist those who injure [us]
• . . but that, when [men] bid us act
contrary to the Law of God and contrary
to justice, we may be frightened away
by no threats or punishments from pre-
ferring the bidding of God to the bid-
ding of man.4
The idea lived on, though not always
in a clearly articulated form, throughout
the early history of Western civilization.
In a world in which Church and State,
the moral and legal authorities, were
deeply intertwined, it is not surprising
that religious heretics and dissenters were
the major forces keeping the tradition
of civil disobedience alive. Before the
nearly absolute separation of Church and
State, it was impossible to separate the
concepts of treason, heresy, revolution,
rebellion, schism and a host of other
things. Since one of the essentials of
3 G. MACGREGOR, THE NEW TESTAMENT BASIS
OF PACIFISM (1942).
4 W. MILLER, NONVIOLENCE: A CHRISTIAN
INTERPRETATION 72 (1964) (quoting LACTAN-
TIUS, DIVINAE INSTITUTIONES VI, xvii, 24).
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civil disobedience has always been an
appeal from the legal to the moral order,
in a system where the two are confused,
it is difficult for such a theory to develop.
Such names as Wycliffe, Waldo, Hus and
Wesley have to be mentioned in the
history of the movement. Such sects as
the Russian Dukhobors and Bezmolitovtsy
have this in common with the more fa-
miliar Quakers, Shakers, Inspirationists
and Mennonites. Unfortunately, even here
the theories were poorly formulated; they
relied too heavily on sectarian religious
interpretations to have a wide following.5
After smoldering for centuries under
the blanket of religious sentiment, modern
theory flashed into the open with Henry
David Thoreau's On the Duty of Civil
Disobedience (1846). Thoreau, fresh
from the breakdown of American puri-
tanism, was the first modern man to
speak of civil disobedience as an entity
in its own right.
Civil disobedience became a political tool
in the hands of Mahatma Gandhi in the
first half of the twentieth century. An
intellectual, mystic, and politician, Gandhi
was, above all, the man who added the
concept and demonstrated the power of
Satyagraha, or soul-force, as a political
weapon. Under his influence non-violence
became an indelible mark of civil dis-
obedience. It was also Gandhi who for-
mulated the first adequately inclusive
theory of civil disobedience.6
5 W. MILLER, NONVIOLENCE: A CHRISTIAN
INTERPRETATION (1964).
6 Gandhi's major theoretical writings were in
newspaper articles in Young India and Harijan.
The best of these are published in English as
MOHANDAS K. GANDHI, NON-VIOLENT RESIST-
ANCE (1962).
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Finally, civil disobedience theory has
been brought up to date in most dramatic
fashion to all the world in the present
Negro revolt in America. Emphasis has
been on action, not theory, but the latter
is not totally lacking. The Reverend
Martin Luther King's Letter From a Bir-
mingham Jail will be handed on as a
classic of American literature.
Despite the contributions of Thoreau,
Gandhi and King, there remains a re-
markable gap in contemporary civil dis-
obedience theory, namely its integration
into a wider tradition of political thought.
Perhaps one reason for this is the peculiar
reluctance of American scholars to admit
the possibility of an integrated philosophy
of life. Another reason is the nature of
civil disobedience itself, for it is above all
a living, dynamic thing, interested in get-
ting the job done, constantly testing new
ideas and techniques and valuing theory
only as a guide and a means. From the
simple beginnings in ancient Greece to the
modern American sit-ins, civil disobedi-
ence has undergone many changes and
refinements. However, upon close exami-
nation it appears that a stable pattern
has been sufficiently established to make
generalizations valid. Even granting the
difficulty of hitting a moving target, we
need a definition of civil disobedience as
a key to understanding and as a guide
for action. Several articles have been
written to synthesize historical contribu-
tions and contemporary Negro experiences
into a realistic definition. 7 The following
7Special acknowledgment must be given to the
JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, which devotes an
issue to the topic of civil disobedience, 58 J.
PHILOSOPHY no. 1.
paragraphs rely heavily, but.,not ;exclu-
sively on these efforts.
II
First of all, civil disobedience is not
rebellion. If political rebellion may be
defined as "the unlawful overthrow [or
attempted overthrow] of a government or
ruler on the part of the governed for the
purpose of substituting a new ruler or
government," 8 it is clearly beyond the
intent of civil disobedients. This is ob-
vious if one has followed the American
demonstrations. The means used, sit-ins,
marches, pickets, etc., are deliberately in-
adequate for the purpose; public authori-
ties are (ideally) forewarned of the pre-
cise action to be taken and why it will be
taken; no attempt is made to take over
or seriously disrupt services essential to
the community-at-large;9 there is no gen-
eral rejection of the authority of the
government. Disobedients readily, if not
enthusiastically, submit to arrest and
punishment by the legitimate authorities.
As Professor Cohen has stated:
Rebellion seeks the overthrow of "con-
stituted authority, or at least repudiates
that authority in some sphere; civil dis-
obedience does neither. Of course civil
disobedience may lead up to a revolu-
tionary conspiracy (although that, is
S Lewy, Resistance to Tyranny: Treason, Right
or Duty?, 13 WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY
588 (1960).
9 When such diiruptions have been threatened
or have occurred, e.g., by the New York
CORE faction on the opening day of the
World's Fair, they have been denounced by
responsible civil rights leaders,
highly unlikely in any healthy democ-
racy), but the civil disobedient, as such,
acts within the frame of established au-
thority, not outside of it.1°
Clearly, civil disobedience is not rebel-
lion. At the same time, it is illegal, and
this is its most obvious aspect. It is not
just another illegal act in the same class
as speeding, larceny or murder. It differs
from these in two essential ways: (1) the
illegal actions of civil disobedience are
done openly in full sight of the authorities,
and (2) the participants act with the
intention of accepting the punishment re-
sulting from their protest.
If civil disobedience is always illegal,
it is also always a protest. The protest
may be specific or general; it may be
positive or negative. It may be for a
fair voice in government or against a
segregation law; for a fair-housing law
or against an air raid regulation, and so
forth. In any case, a law is broken as
a protest against an unbearable situation
and in the hope of changing that situation.
The essential parts of any protest are
its motivation and goals. The motivation
of civil disobedience is the dissonance
caused by an alleged injustice, and the
goal is justice. This brings up a highly
controversial point: how does one justify
civil disobedience? This seems to the
writer to be the weakest point of con-
temporary theory, at least in the sense
that there has been little systematic treat-
ment of it. Historically, Antigone ap-
pealed to a higher law of nature, the early
Christians appealed to the law of God,
10 Cohen, The Essence and Ethics of Civil
Disobedience, 198 THE NATION 258 (1964).
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Thoreau appealed to his own conscience,
Gandhi appealed to the Fatherhood of
God and the brotherhood of man and
Martin Luther King appeals primarily to
the basic dignity of all men. Current
feeling seems to be, "to each his own."
But in another sense, the appeal is not
upward to a more noble reality, but out-
ward to the sympathy of all citizens. For
this reason one of the essentials of civil
disobedience is publicity. Objects of the
demonstrators' ire are often chosen pri-
marily for their propaganda value, not as
being outrageously unjust in themselves."
The hope is that enough people, or the
right people, will reflect upon the situa-
tion, see the injustice the demonstrators
point to, and apply sufficient pressure on
the authorities to change the repugnant
situation.
Non-violence is an essential of civil
disobedience that all theorists since
Gandhi have found indispensable. By it-
self, non-violence is a broader term than
civil disobedience, and need not be il-
legal. Thus while non-violence need not
be civil disobedience, civil disobedience
must be non-violent. The most immedi-
ate reason for this is expediency. Viol-
ence is repugnant by nature, and in an
appeal to the public's sense of justice, it
must be avoided at all costs. A more
philosophical reason arises from the na-
ture of the State. The raison d'etre of a
State is to seek the common good, which
at minimum means preserving law and
order. Violence, even in the form of
resistance to arrest, is a direct challenge
"' Russell, Civil Disobedience, 61 NEW STATES-
MAN 245 (1961).
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to the State, and a form of rebellion. A
State, like a person, has a right to self-
defense. Although its means are ordinari-
ly peaceful, it has the right to use force
for this defense. If public officials see in
civil disobedience a threat to their exist-
ence, force will not be long in coming.
This, incidentally, is another argument for
publicity. Taken by surprise, a police
force may see a threat of violence where
none is intended. Given a chance to put
on their kid gloves for the TV cameras,
the authorities move much more gently.
These seem to be the main elements
of civil disobedience as it exists today,
and the necessary starting point for an
attempt at theory. Putting the elements
together in a definition, we can say that
civil disobedience is an illegal, but non-
violent, public protest based on an ap-
peal for justice. Our attempt to integrate
the concept of civil disobedience into tra-
ditional political thought-in this case,
using a Thomistic legal model-will be
based on this existential definition.
Ill.
The doctrine of law is the key to
Thomas' treatment of politics, and it will
be helpful to review it for our study of
civil disobedience. Thomas begins to dis-
cuss law not by building up from individ-
ual cases to general norms, but from an
overall understanding of the Cosmos.
The first, overarching law is Eternal Law,
which is "nothing other than the ideal of
divine wisdom considered as directing all
actions and movements."' 2  By this it
12 T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-II, q. 93,
art. 1. In general, the quotations here follow
would seem that Thomas means nothing
else than the rational ordering of the
universe by God. The very definition of
law-all law-comes from this under-
standing of Eternal Law. It is perhaps
the most quoted of Thomistic concepts:
"An Ordinance of reason for the com-
mon good promulgated by him who has
the care of the community."13
Eternal Law is divided into three
classes: the laws governing the non-
rational world; Divine Positive Law (rev-
elation) governing the supra-rational
world; and Natural Law, governing the
rational world. Of these, the laws of the
physical world, strictly speaking, have no
distinct reality apart from the Eternal
Law because they involve no rationality
of their own, and law, by its very nature,
is based in reason. Natural law is divided
most conveniently into personal norms,
custom and human positive law. Of these,
again, only human positive law can be
considered law in its own right distinct
from natural law, for only this fits the
definition as being promulgated and for
the common good. (Custom is not pro-
mulgated and personal norms tend to
personal perfection.) The Thomistic
legal model may be diagramed as follows:
the Dawson translation, although where the
text warranted it, I have not hesitated to sub-
stitute my own translation. J. DAwsoN,
AQUINAS: SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS
(D'Entrev~s 1948).
1 Id., I-I, q. 90, art. 4. One might wonder at
the advisability of using this "deductive" legal
model for a modem problem. Because it
allows the systematic, as opposed to eclectic,
integration of positive laws into a moral order,
I feel the present combination inductive-
deductive approach is necessary.
(I) Eternal Law (The Rational Order of the World)
Laws of the (3) Divine





(4) Human Positive Law
It is important to realize that human
law retains its nature as law only as
long as it maintains its proper relation-
ship to Eternal Law. Each degree of law
is binding in a manner that fits its own
proper being as derived from Eternal
Law. All human dealings, indeed, every-
thing in the world, is subject to Eternal
Law without even the possibility of re-
jecting it. 14 Divine Positive Law, or rev-
elation, does not bind everyone, but only
those to whom it has been revealed and
given in faith. 15 Natural law binds men
insofar as they possess reason, for it is
the glory of men that they can participate
freely in the Divine Reason by freely
controlling their own actions and those
of others in conformity with Eternal
Law.Ie
Human law-the specification and
clarification of natural law-binds insofar
as it is in accord with reason, i.e., insofar
as it is a just control of men's actions.
14 Id., I-II, q. 93, art. 6, Respondeo.
1 This is clearly the import of I-II, q. 98, art. 5,
hlthough the question concerned in that article
bnly involves the Old Law of the Jews.
ib SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-II, q. 91, art. 3.
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In a masterful statement St. Thomas says
Saint Augustine says: . . . 'There is no
law unless it be just.' So the validity of
law depends upon its justice. But in
human affairs a thing is said to be just
when it accords a right with the rule of
reason: and, . . . the first rule of reason
is the natural law. Thus all humanly
enacted laws are in accord with reason
to the extent that they derive from the
natural law. And if a human law is at
variance in any particular with the nat-
ural law, it is no longer legal, but rather
a corruption of law.1"
If we were to plot this on our Tho-
mistic legal model, the model would look
like this:
(I) Eternal Law (The Rational Order of the World)
Laws of the I (3) Divine Positive





To understand the significance of law
having only a limited power to command
obedience, it will be profitable to analyze
17 Id., I-II, q. 95, art. 2.
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more closely the elements of Aquinas'
definition of law as "An ordinance of
reason for the common good promulgated
by him who has care of the community,"
as it applies to human love.
(a) Ordinance. Law (in the Latin,
lex, from ligare, meaning to bind) is an
ordinance or a rule and measure of acts
because it binds one to act or refrain
from acting within a specified limit. For
Thomas, the unwritten limit in every
written law is justice.
(b) Reason. When we speak of a
law binding human acts, we must say
that law is based in human reason, for
reason sets the moral bounds of all hu-
man acts by measuring their justice. As
is stated in the Summa,
now the first rule and measure of human
acts is the reason, which is the first
principle of human acts . . . . since it
belongs to the reason to direct to the
end, which is the first principle in all
matters of action, according to the
Philosopher. 18
Or, as Thomas stated more explicitly a
few paragraphs later, "The force of law
depends on the extent of its justice. Now
in human affairs a thing is said to be just
from being right according to the rule of
reason." 9
Involved here is the classic distinction
between law based in reason and law
based in the human will of the lawmaker.
Throughout the history of law this has
been controverted. Ulpian, in the second
century, clearly stated the other position
as "whatever pleases the Sovereign has
18 Id., I-I, q. 90, art. 1.
19 Id., I-I, q. 95, art. 2.
the force of law," which, as I understand
it, is essentially the position of present-
day legal positivists." Thomas explicitly
rejects law based only on will because of
his tremendous respect for the reasoning
power not only of the ruler, but of all
men.
(c) Common Good. Law, in order
to be just, must be directed primarily to
the common good, not to individual or
private satisfactions. According to the
Scholastic doctor
Now laws are said to be just-from
their end, when they are ordained to the
common good-and from their author,
that is to say, when the law that is made
does not exceed the power of the law-
giver-and from their form, when, to
wit, burdens are laid on the subjects
according to an equality of proportion
and with a view to the common good.
. . . On the other hand, laws may be
unjust in two ways: first, by being con-
trary to human good, through being op-
posed to the things mentioned above
-either in respect of the end, as when
an authority imposes on his subjects bur-
densome laws, conducive, not to the
common good, but rather to his own
cupidity or vainglory, or in respect of
the author, as when a man makes a law
that goes beyond the power committed
to him; or in respect of the form, as
when burdens are imposed unequally on
the community, although with a view to
the common good. The like are acts of
violence rather than laws. 2'
20 For example, Bedeau, On Civil Disobedience,
48 J. PHILOSOPHY (1961). Obviously Ulpian
did not have the last word on the topic. This
is a basic problem in law and a key to Tho-
mistic Legal Theory. For a further historical
development, see T. DAIRTT, NATURE OF LAW
(1951).
21 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, 1-I, q. 96, art. 4.
The notion of common good in Tho-
mistic law needs emphasis, for this is
precisely the goal of civil government,
and Thomas distinguishes types of gov-
ernment by the means and extent to
which they fulfill this function. As the
means proper to government, law must
aim to implement the common good
which is best described as "universal well-
being." As St. Thomas says
the last end of human life is bliss or
well-being. . . . Consequently the law
must needs regard principally the rela-
tionship to well-being. Moreover, since
every part is ordained to the whole, as
imperfect to perfect, and since one man
is a part of the perfect community [i.e.,
the State], the law must needs regard
properly the relationship to universal
well-being. 22
This relationship of law and the com-
mon good will be better understood when
we come to a discussion of legal justice.
(d) Promulgation. A law must be
promulgated in order that those to whom
it will apply may obey it. This publica-
tion need not extend to everyone, nor is
there any "sanctified" means by which it
must be published. It does have to be
available to everyone. Since this causes
no present difficulty, we shall do no more
than point out the very public nature of
civil disobedience.
(e) Public Authority. St. Thomas
does a very interesting thing in putting
the power to make law in the hands of
"him who has care of the community."
Although we naturally assume that he
means "civil government," this is not the
case. He does not give the power ex-
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clusively to a King, to Parliament, or
even to some vague "legitimate ruler."
Nor, for obvious reasons, did he put the
law-making power in the hands of each
individual. His language indicates the
complexity of the problem, as he gives
the power to make law either to the
whole people or to their representative
-who is unspecified! In Thomas' words
A law, properly speaking, regards first
and foremost the order to common good.
Now to order anything to the common
good belongs either to the whole people
or to someone who is the representative
of the whole people or to a public per-
sonage who has care of the whole people,
since in all other matters the directing
of anything to an end concerns him to
whom the end belongs. 23
This point is of great significance for
an understanding of civil disobedience,
and brings us back to the topic proper.
A "public personage" can be tautological-
ly defined as a "public authority" or "one
who has care of the community." This
authority belongs either to the whole peo-
ple or to those who rule in their name.
Aquinas' notion of public authority in no
way limits it to a formal governmental
structure. Nor does it deny the possibility
that an authority may be established for
a limited time or for a limited purpose,
i.e., to judge a law or custom to be unjust
and thus no longer binding.
One of the marks of Aquinas' wisdom
-or good luck, if you prefer-is that he
did not overstate his case for authority.
Authority comes from God as a con-
comitant of natural law, for only thus
23 Id., I-II, q. 90, art. 3.22 Id., 1-11, q. 90, art. 2.
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can one man have the power to order
another. Jacques Maritain explains
Thomas' intention quite well:
If in the cosmos, a nature, such as
human nature, can only be preserved and
developed in a state of culture, and if
the state of culture necessarily entails a
certain condition-the relation of author-
ity among men-this relation is demand-
ed by natural law.
24
Though authority comes from God,
this does not mean that certain people
are designated by a divine finger to rule.
Authority is a necessary function of liv-
ing in society, and the society itself, the
people, have the right not only to desig-
nate who shall have the authority over
them, but how they shall get that author-
ity. Nowhere does Thomas explicitly
discuss the means of transmitting author-
ity from the people to the public author-
ity. Therefore there is nothing within the
Thomistic notion of authority itself which
would forbid civil disobedients from ap-
pointing themselves a public authority in
a limited area, then appealing to the peo-
ple for approval. This is precisely what
happens. Organized civil disobedients
are not mere breakers of the law. Rather,
in their act of disobedience they take on
the character of public authority; they act
as representatives of the people; they
actually take on a law-judging function.2 5
They appeal to reason in the name of
24 J. MARITAIN, SCHOLASTICISM AND POLITICS
82 (3d Adler transl. 1954).
25At this point, it may be worth while to
point out the relation of law-judging to law-
making in the Thomistic model. On the one
hand, since law is always for the public good,
only a public authority can make a law. But
for the same reason, only a public authority
justice; they explicitly seek the common
good; they take upon themselves the care
of the community; and, they promulgate
their goals and actions and in this very
act seek a public mandate. In short, they
do all that is required of a lawmaking
body.
Therefore, as we earlier pointed out
the practical difference between mere dis-
obedience to the law and civil disobedi-
ence, so here we establish the philosoph-
ical difference. The former is a law-
breaking activity of a private citizen; the
latter is a law-making action of a repre-
sentative of the community, in this case,
the organization of civil disobedients.26
Although Thomas did not state how
public authority can be legitimately at-
tained, he did show how it could not be
gained, and this establishes the philosoph-
can judge the justness of a law. St. Thomas is
very clear on this, "Now since it belongs to the
same authority to interpret and to make a
law, just as a law cannot be made safe by
public authority, so neither can a judgment be
pronounced except by public authority which
extends over those who are subject to the
community." SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I1-II, q. 60,
art. 6. Is St. Thomas saying that public au-
thority is its own judge-one from which there
is no appeal? Two alternatives present them-
selves: (a) a private citizen may always judge
that a law violates his conscience and not
obey it, and (b) there can be an appeal from
one public authority to another. This is pre-
cisely where civil-disobedients fit in.
2c For a further discussion of authority in
Thomistic thought, the reader is referred to
Y. SIMON, PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRATIC Gov-
ERNMENT 158-60 (1951) and J. MARITAIN,
MAN AND THE STATE (1963). The latter has a
fascinating section on prophetic-shock minori-
ties in a democratic state. His position is
basically the same as that of this paper, al-
though not applied specifically to the problem
of civil disobedience.
ical basis for the non-violence of civil
disobedience. In his Commentary on the
Sentences of Peter Lombard, the Angelic
Doctor writes
Authority may fail to derive from God
for two reasons: either because of
the way in which it has been obtained,
or in consequence of the use which is
made of it. There are two ways in
which the first may occur. Either be-
cause of a defect in the person, who is
unworthy, or because of some defect in
the way itself by which power was ac-
quired, if, for example, through violence,
or simony or some other immoral meth-
od. . . . The second defect prevents the
establishment of any just authority; for
whoever possesses himself of power by
violence does not truly become lord and
master.
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Thus, not only is non-violence an ex-
pedient for civil disobedients, it is an
absolute necessity for the moral value of
their actions.
Turning now from law and authority,
we must consider justice, the natural
anchor of all human law.
IV.
Justice is the one limit on human law
that includes all others. Justice falls into
the category of habits. To give a proper
definition, Thomas says that "[jiustice is
a habit whereby a man renders to each
one his due." Because it is a habit direct-
ing one to good actions it is a virtue.
Justice is traditionally divided into par-
ticular and general (more commonly
27 T. AQUINAS, COMMENTARY ON THE SEN-
TENCES OF PETER LOMBARD Bk. II, Dist. 44,
q. 2, a. 2. (Dawson ed.) (emphasis added).
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called "legal") justice. This is an im-
portant breakdown for our purpose, and
despite its length, Thomas' statement de-
serves to be quoted in detail:
Justice directs man in his relations with
other men. Now this may happen in
two ways: first, as regards his relations
with individuals; secondly, as regards his
relations with others in general, insofar
as a man who serves a community serves
all those who are included in that com-
munity. Accordingly justice in its proper
acceptance can be directed to another
in both these senses. Now it is evident
that all who are included in a community
stand in relation to that community as
parts to a whole; which a part, as such,
belongs to a whole, so that whatever is
the good of a part can be directed to
the good of the whole. . . . It is in this
sense that justice is called a general
virtue. And since it belongs to the law
to direct to the common good, it follows
that justice which is in this way styled
general, is called 'legal justice' because
thereby man is in harmony with law
which directs the acts of all the virtues
to the common good.
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St. Thomas' concept of general justice
is not the genus justice, but rather one
species of justice, the other being par-
ticular justice. (This latter may then be
taken as a genus and given the species
commutative and distributive justice.)
Legal justice is itself a special habit or
virtue. In another place Thomas wrote:
Because where there is a special con-
sideration of the object in a general mat-
ter, there must necessarily be a special
habit; from this it follows that legal
justice itself is a determined virtue hav-
28 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, II-II, q. 58, art. 5.
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
ing its species from this it tends to the
common good. 29
In short, legal justice is a specifically
distinct virtue, since virtues are specified
by their objects and the common good is
an object specifically distinct from the
objects of any other virtue.
The proper object of legal justice is
the common good and the proper object
of law is the common good. It is here
that two concepts meet. Because legal
justice is based in natural law, its horizon
is not limited to that of human positive
law, but extends beyond it. It is prior
in time and nature to civil law, and in
order to be valid, civil law must be in
conformity with legal justice. An act of
civil disobedience deals with legal justice,
because it is the act of a public authority
for the common good. It is a virtue and
a proper and immediate act of legal jus-
tice, since its function is not merely to
direct the acts of other virtues to the
common good, but relates directly to it
as its goal.
In a system in which a law must be
just to bind the citizens, the question of
who may judge the justness of a law be-
comes very important. Here is the point
of greatest disagreement at the present
time. Merely because a group claims to
be a public authority, it does not ipso
facto have a right to judge that a law is
immoral. After establishing that judg-
ment is necessary for justice, Thomas sets
out three conditions for such a judgment
to be valid:
Now three conditions are requisite for
29T. AQUINAS, In Decem Libros Ethicorum
Aristotelis ad Nicomachum Expositio, Lib. V,
Lect. 2, no. 192 (Dawson ed.).
a judgment to be an act of justice: first,
that it proceed from the inclination of
justice; secondly, that it come from one
who is in authority; thirdly, that it be
pronounced according to the right ruling
of prudence. If any one of these be
lacking, the judgment will be faulty and
unlawful3 0
These conditions may rightfully serve
as norms to determine the right of civil
disobedients to judge-and, in effect,
force a change in-a certain law.
(a) Motivation. The correct motiva-
tion is not unduly difficult for an individ-
ual to reach, but extremely difficult for a
large group. Revenge, anger, frustration
or just the lust for excitement are far
easier motivations to arouse, but totally
immoral as a basis for civil disobedience.
The group must be brought to a love for
justice. This often requires a period of
education and training, as Gandhi pointed
out.
(b) Authority. Only a public author-
ity has the right to make laws, and thus,
to judge laws. Civil disobedients drive a
narrow lane here; they claim enough au-
thority to judge law, but not enough to
be in general rebellion. The three major
requirements they must meet are non-
violence, the open appeal for public sup-
port, and accepting the sanction of the
civil authority as a sign that they are not
rebelling.
(c) Prudence. This is indeed the
most difficult point of all. For what is
one man's prudence is another man's
cowardice. An unjust law, says St.
Thomas, may bind-but only in an ex-
trinsic sense-in order to avoid disturb-
3o SUMMA THEOLOGICA, 1l-II, q. 60, art. 2.
ance or scandal.3 1  Obviously "disturb-
ance" here cannot be taken in an abso-
lute sense, for any group effort to change
law will cause disturbance, even if it is
done in a courtroom. What is meant is
disturbance leading to violence or seri-
ously disrupting the life of a community.
It must be remembered that civil dis-
obedience receives its legal sanction from
an appeal for popular support. This is an
unstable force, and in the face of "back-
lash" or an explosive hostility on the
part of the majority, efforts at education
might be a more effective approach in a
given circumstance.
Scandal is a real danger to be consid-
ered. Here it might apply in that ob-
servers and bystanders, seeing a law be-
ing violated, would be led to break other
laws without the high moral purpose of
civil disobedience. More subtle would be
the sowing of general disrespect for law
among the populace. This is particularly
a danger where civil disobedience is used
too often. For this reason it would seem
a matter of prudence to use civil dis-
obedience only as a last resort-after
more standard means to change unjust
laws have been tried and failed. At the
same time, we must distinguish scandal
and shock. In a given situation the shock
effect of civil disobedience might be a
31 Id., II-II, q. 104, art. 6, ad 3 um.
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most moral stimulant to a lethargic
public.
V.
To summarize briefly: civil disobedi-
ence is a legal and a moral problem. It
must be studied as such to be adequately
understood. The Thomistic philosophy of
law is one framework for doing this.
While depending on the actual history
and practice of civil disobedience for its
data, the model offers a clearly moral
understanding of law within which to
organize the data. Law is necessarily
just in the peculiar sense of legal justice,
or it is not law. This "justness" depends
on the law's relation to reason and to
the common good. Since only public au-
thorities can ultimately make law or de-
cide the justness of a law, civil disobedi-
ents take on the function of public au-
thority in their very act of disobedience.
At the same time, they do not take on
this function in such a way or to such
an extent as to be in rebellion.
As a moral act, civil disobedience is a
virtue requiring the most pure motives,
love of justice, and a delicate sense of
prudence. If understood in all its glory,
civil disobedience is a field on which
Raghavan Iyer's moralist and legalist can
combine to apply the loftiest of ideals to
the most realistic of battlegrounds: the
making and breaking of law.
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